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 Less Developed Country Business Cycles 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Less developed countries (LDCs) have experienced considerable business cycles in recent 
decades. This coincides with significant increases in their external debt to GDP ratios. Recent 
theoretical credit cycles literature suggests that indebtedness, and the resulting liquidity 
constraints, could explain LDC business cycles. This paper builds a macroeconomic model to 
trace the LDC income paths. In this model indebtedness and liquidity constraints reduce 
aggregate investment. We use the World Data (1995) to calibrate for the convergence 
parameter. It is found that LDC cycles are convergent and non-oscillatory, and indebtedness 
delays the return to long-term steady state income.  
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 1 Introduction 
Less developed countries (LDCs) are by no means immune to business cycles. Indeed 
recent crises in Asia and South America suggest that LDC business cycles may have become 
more prevalent over the years. LDC cycles seem to differ from developed country ones in 
several ways. First, LDCs are typically small. Crucini (1997) uses data from 68 small 
countries and finds that country size is negatively related to its volatility in investment, 
consumption, and trade balance ratios. Second, LDCs may be eager to grow. So eager some 
may be that they resort to targeted investment in ‘strategic’, viz. risky, growth industries. 
Singapore recently went into a deeper recession than many countries because of her 
disproportionate reliance on the computer and electronics industries.1 Small size and targeted 
growth diminishes her ability to spread eggs in many baskets, exposing her economy to 
external shocks. Blankenau, Kose, and Yi (2001) and Kose (2002) show that international 
price and interest rate shocks can explain a significant fraction of business cycle variability in 
developing countries. A third characteristic of LDCs is their dependence on foreign loans 
either to smooth their consumption or to finance their investments.2 The present paper 
focuses on this third factor. We aim to investigate how foreign loans propagate LDC business 
cycles.  
 One of the most striking development in LDCs since the 1970s is the significant 
increase of their debt-income ratios. This is summarized in Table One. All empirical data 
used in this investigation are from the World Bank’s World Data published in 1995. Table 
one shows the cumulative external debt stocks taken as snapshots at ten year intervals from 
1971 to 1991. Almost every LDC in Asia (except Hong Kong and Singapore who did not 
borrow), as well as those in South America and Africa, has significantly increased her debt-
GDP ratio. On average, as shown in Table one, Asian countries increased their indebtedness 
by 7.5 times, South American countries by 6.4 times, and African countries by 11.5 times 
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 from 1971 to 1991. What may have caused such dramatic increase in their indebtedness? And 
what impacts it may have had on their business cycles? 
Relatively speaking, South East Asian countries seem to have borrowed more often 
for investment, African countries for consumption, and South American countries somewhere 
in between. This can be seen from Table Two, which shows the annual GDP change averaged 
over ten year intervals from 1964 to 1994. Income grew fastest in South East Asia, less fast in 
South American, and the picture in Africa was predominantly one of contraction especially in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Put Table One and Table Two about here 
 
In this paper we are interested in the consequences rather than the causes of LDC 
indebtedness. Irrespective of its causes and where it took place, a rise in indebtedness is 
likely to have impacts on a country’s investment behavior. Creditors generally demand 
collaterals. A high level of indebtedness, or a dramatic rise in debt, would make it difficult to 
borrow further to finance consumption or undertake investment projects. Further, if a 
country’s financial and banking system is poorly developed, creditors will be particularly 
cautious when debts are already high, and the curb on expenditures will correspondingly be 
stronger.  
 At this point we could draw on an emerging and influential literature on how credits 
can lead to cycles. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) point out that businesses require 
external finance to undertake investment projects when they have low net worth, but low net 
worth leads to high agency costs to borrowers. Agency cost is higher during economic 
downturns than upturns. When cost rises in slumps and falls in booms, they tend to propagate 
business cycles. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) make essentially the same point by 
emphasizing the asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Their main 
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 argument is that bankruptcy cost, which shifts the aggregate supply curve, is counter-cyclical. 
More recently Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) point out that lenders require collaterals such as 
land and other assets for their loans. But the values of such collaterals are pro-cyclical. 
Consequently liquidity constraints will be tighter during slumps than during booms. They 
argue that credits produce cyclical transmission mechanisms both instantaneously and over 
time.  
So the debt-collateral cyclical mechanism, much like Keynes’ much debated “animal 
spirit”, spreads external shocks through the economy. We shall describe the time path after a 
single shock hits, and how this path is affected by the increased indebtedness shown in Table 
one. Section two below contains a simple model of income determination with debts and 
liquidity constraints. The result is that greater indebtedness unambiguously increases 
volatility. In order to describe the income time path more clearly, we use data from the World 
Data to show that indebtedness delays the process of returning to long-term steady state. All 
convergence paths are found to be non-oscillatory and non-explosive. 
 The final Section four offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Modeling LDC business cycles 
Consider the accounting identity at time t between income Y, foreign capital net 
inflow F, consumption C, investment I, government expenditure G (assumed exogenous):  
ttttt GICFY ++=+ .      (1) 
The item that distinguishes LDCs from others is  on the left-hand side. We shall 
argue shortly that  is related to both income and the level of indebtedness in a country. In 
addition, a set of financial liberalization policies seems to have encouraged  into LDCs 
especially since the 1980s. These are measures that open a country's financial market to 
foreign influences: abolishing credit controls, deregulating interest rates, relaxing entry into 
tF
tF
tF
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 the banking and the financial services industry, privatizing the banking sector, and freeing 
international capital-flows. Many of such measures, such as interest rate and foreign 
exchange policies, are sometimes implemented in a relatively short period of time.  
A country’s indebtedness, reflected in , directly affects the severity of liquidity or 
credit constraints consumers and investors face. Our focus in this model is to study the 
interrelations between debt and consumption/investment constraints in the determination of 
income and cycles. Let us now examine each of the variables in (1) in more details. 
tF
 
A. Capital Flows 
  For simplicity we abstract form capital repayments. The net flow of foreign funds, 
denoted , consists of two parts: fresh loan, denoted , and debt servicing or interest paid 
in arrears, denoted .  is interest rate taken to be exogenous. D
tF tL
1−tt Dr tr t is cumulated debt stock 
outstanding at t. Hence  
 1−−= tttt DrLF .      (2) 
 We could measure indebtedness by 0≥≡ ttt YDβ . We will treat indebtedness and 
interest rate as exogenous variables and suppress its time subscripts for the remainder of this 
section. Since there is no capital repayment, fresh loan is just the change in debt stock 
11 −− −=−= ttttt YYDDL ββ . Using (2) we have 
 1)]1([ −+−= ttt YrYF β .     (3) 
Foreign fund in the form of equation (3) links current variables to past incomes and 
provides the first dynamic element in our model.  
 
B. Consumption 
On modeling consumption, recent empirical work has found little support for the life-
cycle permanent incomes (LC-PI) theories (Marjorie Flavin, 1981; Hall and Mishkin, 1982; 
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 Fumio Hayashi 1982). Instead there is growing evidence (see Hall, 1978; Jappelli and 
Pagano, 1989) that liquidity constraints significantly determine consumption behavior 
especially in developing countries.  
Liquidity constraint reduces the opportunity to borrow in order to smooth 
consumption over time. In the extreme, consumers simply spend out of current income. We 
will indeed assume so and write the aggregate consumption function as   
 .       (4) ttt YcC =
)1,0[∈c  is the marginal propensity to consume. From the World Data (1995), the fraction of 
current income spent on consumption has remained very stable in all LDCs. On average the 
value of c is 0.64 for South East Asian countries, 0.69 for South American countries, and 
0.71 for African countries. For simplicity the time-subscript of c will be henceforth be 
suppressed. Their average values just mentioned will be used to calibrate for the convergence 
property of income in Section three below. 
 
C. Investment 
 The credit cycle literature alluded to in the Introduction are concerned mainly with 
investment instead of consumption. Most businesses borrow in order to finance their 
investment projects. Empirical evidence shows that development in the financial 
infrastructure encourages domestic investment but external indebtedness discourages it. 
Carolyn Jenkins (1998), Joshua Greene and Delano Villanueva (1991), and Leonce 
Ndikumana (1999, 2000) show some of the ways in which liquidity constraints affect 
investment. For instance, how credits are granted and the amount of collateral required 
depend on habits and trust, which evolve with the social culture and the economic habits of a 
nation. Jappelli and Pagano (1989) find that nearly half (45%) of all housing loans in the US 
and the UK are extended to homebuyers 29 years or younger, but this occurs much more 
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 rarely in Japan and Italy (17% and 21% respectively). They also show that such phenomena 
owe at least partly to liquidity constraints being less tight in the US and the UK. Further, 
liquidity constraints reflect market imperfections, which are so ingrained into supply and 
demand behavior that only democratization, strengthening of the rule of law, adoption of 
international accounting and banking practices are capable of relaxing liquidity constraints. 
Market imperfections abound in investment credit allocation in LDCs such as Indonesia, 
Thailand, the Philippines or China PRC. Those who have close connections (guan-xi in China 
and cronyism in Indonesia) with central government or bank officials invariably have easier 
access to money credits than others.  
In short, investments are restricted by liquidity constraints, which in turn depend on 
two factors. First, the bigger is the existing indebtedness, the more difficult it will be to 
borrow to finance fresh investment projects. Second, for a given level of indebtedness, 
constraints will be tighter if a country’s financial structure is less well developed or if market 
imperfections are more prevalent.  
 A linear equation of investment suffices to capture much of what we have just 
discussed: 
 1
~
−−−= tt DiriII ,      (5) 
where I  is autonomous investment, i is interest-sensitivity of investment, and  is the 
lending rate for convenience taken to be the same as the rate on which debts are serviced. The 
parameter 
tr
i~  depicts the tightness of the constraint on investment given debt stock . The 
time lag on  is introduced because of the usual lagged response of investment.  A country 
with poorly developed financial market would have a bigger 
1−tD
1−tD
i~ . Since i~  reflects habits, 
trust, and market imperfections, it is usually difficult for a government to change the size of 
i~  (unlike β , which could be changed somewhat more easily by monetary and foreign 
exchange measures). 
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 D. Long-Term Stationary Income 
 Upon substituting (3) to (5) into (1) and solving for Yt we get 
 ,       (6) KAYY tt += −1
where 
 
)1(
)~1(
β
β
+−
−+=
c
irA ,       (7) 
 
)1( β+−
+−=
c
GriIK .       (8) 
 The long-term stationary equilibrium income is given by the particular integral of the 
first-order difference equation (6).  
 
)~()1( ric
riIGYp −+−
−+= β .      (9) 
Two simple observations can be made from (6) and (7). First, 
2)]~()1[(
)~)((
ric
irirIGYp
−+−
−−+=∂
∂
ββ . Thus indebtedness raises Y  if p ir
~> , and conversely. The reason 
is not difficult to see. A rise in β  puts a brake on investment, and the brake is harder the 
bigger is i~ . Hence a rise in β  lowers income if i~  is large. The appearance of r can be 
understood from examining equations (2) and (3). In the steady state both income and debt 
stock are constant. Although fresh loan is zero when income is constant, GDP must be big 
enough to service the debt. The higher is interest rate, the higher must be income for debt 
servicing to continue. It is simple to check that 0<~id
dYp  and 0>∂
∂
r
Yp  as we would expect.  
 
E. Cycles and convergence to long-term steady state 
 The complementary function of the first-order difference equation (6) is given by 
 ,       (10) tc AY )(Φ=
9 
 where Φ  is an arbitrary constant having a scaling effect on income volatility. The sign and 
the magnitude of 
)1(
)~1(
β
β
+−
−+=
c
irA  fundamentally govern volatility. It is simple to check that 
0>∂
∂
β
A , 0>∂
∂
r
A , and 0~ <∂
∂
i
A
i
. We conclude, in words, that indebtedness and higher interest 
rate tend to keep income off its long-term path for longer after an external shock strikes, but 
the structural constraint ~  has the opposite effect. These qualitative results however cannot 
tell us the size and the sign of A, which are really what matters as far as convergence and 
business cycles are concerned. To investigate these rather more pressing questions we turn to 
the method of calibration. 
 
3. Calibration 
 We mentioned in the introductory section above that LDC cycles have become more 
prevalent, and the rise in indebtedness shown in Table one may go some ways to explain such 
phenomena. The path of income would be convergent if the absolute value of A is less than 
unity, and divergent otherwise. The path would also be oscillatory if A is negative, but non-
oscillatory otherwise. In this section we resolve these issues by calibrating the value of A for 
Asian, South American and African countries separately. 
 Annual data for most of the variables needed to calculate A in equation (10) are 
available for 1970 to 1993 from the World Data (1995). The main difficulty is the possible 
values of i~ . While the micro foundations of credit-constrained investment have been built 
recently by Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki 
and Moore’s (1997), empirical macro estimates of the constraint parameters do not exist. The 
World Data (1995) is also too aggregated for this purpose. I resort instead to some plausible 
values of i~ , in order to visualize the pattern of convergence and how it might have been 
changed by the increased indebtedness over the years. 
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  For interest rates I use the official average interest rate reported for each country in 
the World Data. Figure one shows the fluctuation of interest rates for the three continents’ 
LDCs. As mentioned earlier the fraction of consumption out of current income has been very 
stable for most countries, and we will use the average over the years, i.e. 0.64, 0.69 and 0.71 
for South East Asia, South America, and Africa respectively. Combining these with average 
interest rate and debt-GDP ratio for each year, Figure two plots the value of A based on a 
hypothetical value of 01.0~ =i
1
. This value has the interpretation that each additional $100 of 
debt incurred in year t would so tighten the liquidity constraint that it reduces investment by 
one dollar in year t . +
Figure three repeats the exercise assuming a tighter liquidity constraint 1.0~ =i , i.e. 
each additional $100 of debt incurred in year t reduces investment in 1+t  $10. 
 
Put Figures One, Two and Three about here 
 
 Several observations emerge clearly from Figures two and three. First, each curve 
shows a clear positive trend. Rising indebtedness has raised the value of A for all countries 
concerned. In other words, when an external shock pushes GDP below trend and brings about 
a recession, say, this country would remain in recession for much longer in 1990 than if the 
shock was received in 1970. By the same token, an external positive shock would keep the 
economy on a boom for longer in 1990 than in 1970. The prolonged recovery path increases 
the chances of subsequent shocks building on each other, and in that sense increases the 
volatility exacerbate their business cycles. Second, comparing Figure two with Figure three, 
it is interesting to see that tightening liquidity constraint (a larger i~ ) reduces the value of A. 
The reason is that much of the cyclical movement in the system comes from the volatility of 
investment. If information and the market is imperfect, creditors will be more cautious in 
11 
 financing investment and the liquidity constraint will be tight. This increases i~ , causing both 
a smaller long-term income (last section) and a smaller A. Thus GDP returns to its trend level 
sooner under a tighter liquidity constraint. This does not necessarily imply less fluctuation in 
income however. Again suppose the economy is hit by a contractionary shock. A quicker 
return to trend implies a more vigorous movement of GDP year-on-year than it would 
otherwise be the case.  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have focused exclusively on business cycles of less developed. 
Recent experience, especially from the 1980s and 1990s, has shown that LDC incomes are 
becoming more volatile. In addition, their external debt to GDP ratio has significantly 
increased over the same period. We tried to link the two phenomena, taking cues from the 
recent credit cycles literature. This theoretical literature would predict more volatility from 
the increased indebtedness. Our contribution is to describe the cyclical path of income in 
more detail.  
As suggested by the literature we model indebtedness to affect mainly investment. 
More precisely it affects the liquidity constraint investors face. The more indebted one is, the 
more will be the demand on collaterals and the more difficult it is to borrow more to finance 
fresh investment. In Section two we also find that long-term steady state income may be 
reduced if such liquidity constraint is sufficiently tight. In Section three we the World Data to 
calibrate the convergence path implied by plausible values of liquidity constraints. In general 
we find LDCs in Asia, South America and Africa to have remained largely non-oscillatory 
and non-explosive. The rise in indebtedness slows the process of returning to long-term 
income after an external shock strikes. Tighter liquidity constraint has the opposite effect, 
leading to more vigorous movements of income year-on-year.  
12 
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 Table 1. External debt – GDP ratio (percents). Source: World Data 1995. 
Asia 1971 1981 1991 
Bangladesh Not available (n.a.) 0.32 0.62 
China n.a. 0.03 0.17 
India 0.06 0.11 0.26 
Indonesia 0.13 0.39 0.73 
Korea, Republic of 0.08 0.4 0.2 
Malaysia 0.05 0.29 0.39 
Nepal n.a. 0.09 0.47 
Philippines 0.12 0.53 0.79 
Thailand 0.06 0.25 0.39 
Asian average 0.06 0.27 0.45 
 South America 
Argentina 0.07 0.34 0.6 
Brazil 0.06 0.34 0.4 
Chile 0.21 0.85 0.66 
Colombia 0.14 0.29 0.42 
Costa Rica 0.13 0.84 0.77 
Ecuador 0.09 0.75 0.99 
El Salvador 0.06 0.26 0.45 
Guatemala 0.04 0.17 0.35 
Honduras 0.06 0.47 0.73 
Mexico 0.1 0.55 0.72 
Paraguay 0.08 0.32 0.47 
Peru 0.2 0.35 0.95 
Uruguay 0.07 0.28 0.8 
Venezuela 0.05 0.71 0.62 
Sth .Am. average 0.1 0.47 0.64 
Africa 
Botswana 0.15 0.19 0.27 
Burundi 0.02 0.2 0.73 
Cameroon 0.04 0.26 0.63 
Chad 0.07 0.36 0.57 
Congo 0.17 0.87 1.93 
Ghana 0.12 0.34 0.7 
Guyana 0.4 1.94 5.8 
Kenya 0.14 0.5 0.76 
Nigeria 0.04 0.44 0.95 
Oman n.a. 0.16 0.29 
Rwanda n.a. 0.1 0.37 
Sierra Leone 0.16 1.02 1.98 
Somalia 0.14 1.2 2.4 
Sudan 0.04 0.41 0.96 
Swaziland 0.12 0.43 0.4 
Togo 0.06 0.81 0.99 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.03 0.18 0.52 
Zaire 0.06 0.76 1.58 
Zambia 0.46 1.58 3.09 
Zimbabwe 0.07 0.26 0.52 
African average 0.11 0.6 1.27 
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 Table 2. Average Annual GDP growth. Source: World Data 1995. 
Asia 1964-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 
Bangladesh 0.02 0.04 0.04 
China 0.09 0.08 0.10 
Hong Kong 0.09 0.09 0.06 
India 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Indonesia 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Korea, Republic of 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Malaysia 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Nepal 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Philippines 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Singapore 0.11 0.08 0.07 
Thailand 0.08 0.07 0.09 
Asian average 0.07 0.06 0.06 
South America 
Argentina 0.04 0.01 0.02 
Brazil 0.09 0.04 0.03 
Chile 0.03 0.02 0.07 
Colombia 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Costa Rica 0.07 0.03 0.04 
Ecuador n.a. 0.05 0.03 
El Salvador 0.05 0.00 0.03 
Guatemala 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Honduras 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Mexico 0.07 0.05 0.02 
Paraguay 0.05 0.07 0.03 
Peru 0.05 0.01 0.00 
Uruguay 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Venezuela 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Sth. Am. Average 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Africa 
Burundi 0.06 0.04 -0.07 
Cameroon 0.03 0.09 -0.12 
Congo 0.06 0.09 -0.10 
Ghana 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 
Guyana 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 
Kenya 0.08 0.04 -0.07 
Nigeria 0.05 0.00 -0.06 
Rwanda 0.05 0.06 -0.09 
Sierra Leone 0.05 0.02 -0.09 
South Africa 0.05 0.02 -0.10 
Sudan 0.02 0.05 -0.19 
Togo 0.06 0.02 -0.10 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.03 0.04 -0.12 
Zaire 0.04 -0.01 -0.21 
Zambia 0.04 0.00 -0.09 
Zimbabwe 0.08 0.02 -0.07 
African average 0.05 0.03 -0.10 
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 Figure One: interest rates. Source: World Data (1995) 
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 Figure Two: the value of A governing business cycles  
(relatively loose liquidity constraint 01.0~ =i ) 
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 Figure Three: the value of A governing business cycles  
(relatively tight liquidity constraint 1.0~ =i ) 
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
So
ut
h 
Ea
st
 A
si
a
 
0.00000
0.05000
0.10000
0.15000
0.20000
0.25000
0.30000
0.35000
0.40000
0.45000
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
So
ut
h 
A
m
er
ic
a
 
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0.9000
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
A
fr
ic
a
 
18 
 Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Singapore’s economy shrank by 7% in the fourth quarter of 1998, and by 12% in the fourth quarter of 2001. 
2 This third factor do not apply to two of the fastest growing LDCs in Asia, namely Hong Kong and Singapore, 
as they are both net creditors rather than debtors in terms of international finance and investment. 
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